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ABSTRACT
Article 234 is exceptional regarding its wording and placement in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as
in its historical background. The Arctic provision has given rise to diver-
gent interpretations regarding the conditions for invoking it, the limita-
tions on the authority under Article 234, and its spatial scope of
application. It has served as a justification for specific legislation adopted
by Canada and Russia that has been opposed by the United States. The
article, describes as a “textbook example of finding a compromise in
international treaty negotiations,” was negotiated directly and privately,
among these three states during the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). This article describes the historical
background to Article 234 and sheds new light on the negotiating pro-
cess that led to the adoption of the provision.
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Introduction
Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 was
negotiated directly and privately, among Canada, the United States, and the USSR, dur-
ing the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). It has
been described as both a “textbook example of finding a compromise in international
treaty negotiations”2 and a “witch’s brew, a caldron of legal uncertainty which could be
stirred in favor of either the coastal or shipping state.”3
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
 2021 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November
1994), 1833 UNTS 3 UNCLOS, Art 234:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention,
reduction, and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone,
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the
protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.
2 K. Bartenstein, “The Arctic Exception in the Law of the Sea Convention: A Contribution to Safer Navigation in the
Northwest Passage?” (2011) 42 Ocean Development and International Law 22, 27.
3 C. Lamson and D. VanderZwaag, “Arctic Waters: Needs and Options for Canadian-American Cooperation” (1987) 18
Ocean Development and International Law 49, 81.
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The clause has served as a justification for specific legislation adopted by Canada4
and Russia.5 Other Arctic states might follow suit in the future, although only Denmark
(on behalf of Greenland) has indicated an interest in doing so by preparing draft legisla-
tion.6 Norway could potentially apply Article 234 within ice-covered areas adjacent to
Svalbard, but this would be problematic because it has not established an exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ) in this area.7 For the United States, the lack of accession to
UNCLOS could create difficulties for the legislative application of Article 234 off the
coasts of Alaska. Nonetheless, the United States has actively responded to Russia’s and
Canada’s interpretation and implementation of Article 234.8
Article 234 is exceptional regarding how it came about, as well as its wording and
placement in the UNCLOS. The provision allows a coastal state to prescribe and enforce
laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control vessel-source pollution. Other
clauses that address coastal state prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction to adopt
rules and standards to prevent, reduce, and control vessel-source pollution in their
maritime zones are located in Sections 5 (Article 211) and 6 (Article 220) of Part XII of
the UNCLOS. Article 234, however, is placed in Section 8 on “ice-covered areas.”
Unlike the provisions in Section 5 of Part XII, Article 234 does not contain any refer-
ence to international standards or a competent international organization, such as the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). A review of legislation by the IMO is a
critical element of the system of “checks and balances” respecting coastal state jurisdic-
tion over navigation within the law of the sea. The significance of IMO review is not
only procedural, as it can also substantively constrain coastal state jurisdiction.9
4 Canada has stated that Article 234 “provides a complete legal justification” in international law for Northern Canada
Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG). See IMO Doc. MSC 88/11/3, 5 October 2010, para. 5. Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985 (AWPPA), c. A-12.
5 Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route, approved by the order of the Ministry of Transport
of Russia, 17 January 2013, No. 7, registered by the Ministry of Justice, 2 April 2013, No. 28120. In a note handed to
the Arctic Sunrise, published on the Administration of the Northern Sea Route (ANSR) website, Notification No. 77, 20
September 2013, on file with author, the ANSR stated that the ship was refused a permit on the grounds that there
had been a: Violation of the Rules of navigation in the water area of the NSR, adopted and enforced by the Russian
Federation in accordance with the article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,—
navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route from 24.08.2013 to 27.08.2013 without permission of the
Northern Sea Route Administration, as well as taken actions in this [sic] creating potentially [sic] threat of marine
pollution in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, ice-covered for most part of the year.
6 See T. Henriksen, "Norway, Denmark (in respect of Greenland) and Iceland” ’in R. C. Beckman, T. Henriksen, K. D.
Kraabel et al. (eds.), Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States (Brill
Nijhoff, 2017), 277.
7 Ibid, 253.
8 See United States, "Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy, Ottawa, Canada to Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade of Canada" (18 August 2010), 2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/179287.pdf (accessed 27
September 2020), and "Diplomatic Note from the United States to Russia regarding the NSR" (29 May 2015) reproduced
in CarrieLyn D. Guymon (ed.), Digest Of United States Practice In International Law 2015, 526.
9 See Secretary-General of the IMO during MEPC 60,
Decisions made by consensus in this Organization stand good chances to be widely and effectively
implemented. For the need and for the sake of succeeding in making decisions by consensus, sometimes it
takes considerable time in making decisions, and this has, from time to time, given rise to people criticizing this
Organization for being slow and, by implication, inefficient. In this Organization, we dislike taking a vote. Voting
is divisive and one would ask what chances of implementation have the technical standards adopted in this
Organization if the decision to introduce that standard has been made on a 51 to 49% basis. Sometimes, the
decision, if consensus cannot be achieved, will have to be made in accordance with the Organization’s well
established and well-functioning Rules of Procedure, meaning that decisions are made on a majority basis,
which leads to the conclusion that whatever people may think, this is a democratically based Organization.
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An IMO review can entail the adoption of a specific measure by a resolution of a com-
mittee, such as the Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) or the
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). Such resolutions are typically adopted by consen-
sus.10 Instead, the laws and regulations adopted for ice-covered areas are to be nondis-
criminatory and have due regard to navigation and to the protection and preservation
of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.
Article 234 may give rise to divergent interpretations regarding the conditions for
invoking it. The limitation to the powers of Article 234, in particular due regard to
navigation, can raise questions. The purpose of this article is not to delve into the
Article 234 interpretational challenges,11 but rather, to describe the historical back-
ground to Article 234 and provide new insights regarding the negotiating process that
may assist in interpretation of the provision.
Recourse to the preparatory works (travaux preparatoires) and the circumstances of
the conclusion of a treaty can be used as supplementary means of treaty interpret-
ation.12 However, this means of interpretation under the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is largely limited to confirming the meaning resulting
from the application of the general rules of interpretation provided for in VCLT
Article 31,13 unless the meaning is “ambiguous or obscure” or leads to a result that is
“manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”14 Thus, caution is necessary considering the par-
ticular negotiation and drafting technique adopted during UNCLOS III, where,
because of the highly politicized setting, most of the negotiations occurred off the
record in informal negotiating fora, without full official records reflecting the
exchange of positions.
The draft of Article 234 was little discussed on the record at UNCLOS III. The
bulk of the negotiations occurred in private bilateral meetings in different constella-
tions among Canada, the United States, and the USSR. In addition to some of the
long-available records of UNCLOS III,15 the Virginia Commentary,16 the Soviet
counterpart to the Virginia Commentary,17 and the recollection of the members of
Reproduced in S. Hayer, "Decision-making Processes of ICAO and IMO in Respect of Environmental Regulations,"
Study for the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) of the European Parliament (European
Union, 2016), 14.
10 Adoption by consensus is a matter of practice. See Md. Saiful Karim, Prevention of Pollution of the Marine
Environment from Vessels: The Potential and Limits of the International Maritime Organization (Springer, 2015), 35.
11 See, among others, M. H. Nordquist, S. Rosenne and A. Yankov (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 1982: A Commentary, (1991) (Virginia Commentary Vol. IV); Bartenstein, note 2; and E. Franckx and L. Boone,
"Article 234. Ice-covered Areas’in Alexander Proelss (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, A
Commentary (C. H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2017), 1566–1584.
12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980 1155 UNTS 331
1969 VCLT, Art 32.
13 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007), 244–245.
14 VCLT, Art 32(a) and (b).
15 Available online at legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/1973_los/ (accessed 27 September 2020).
16 Myron H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary Volumes I–VII
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011).
17 A. P. Movchan and A. Yankov (eds.), Mirovoi Okean I Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo: Osnovy Sovermmennogo Pravoporjadka v
Mirovom Okeane [World Ocean and International Law: The Basis for the Modern Legal Order in the World Ocean] (Vol. 1,
Nauka, 1986); Pravovoi Rezhim Morskikh Pribrezhnykh Prostranstv [Legal Regime of Maritime Zone] (Vol. 2, Nauka, 1987);
Otrkytoe More. Mezhdunarodnye Prolivy. Arkhipelazhnye Vody [High Seas. International Straits. Archipelagic Waters] (Vol. 3,
Nauka, 1988); Zashita I Sokhranenie Morskoy Sredy [Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment] (Vol. 4,
Nauka, 1990).
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the delegations to UNCLOS III, this article relies on a new element: declassified dip-
lomatic US cables.18
The Pre-UNCLOS III Dawn of Article 234
Introduction to the Interests of the States Involved
The seed for the Arctic clause was planted before UNCLOS III. The 1969 voyage of the
SS Manhattan highlighted a bilateral disagreement between Canada and the United
States regarding the regime of navigation through the Northwest Passage (NWP). It
triggered Canada’s response of enacting specific legislation, followed by Canada’s pursuit
to garner international acceptance for its cause. This eventually led to the negotiations
of the Arctic clause during UNCLOS III among Canada, the United States, and
the USSR.
UNCLOS III was prompted by the desire to “adopt a convention dealing with all
matters relating to the law of the sea.”19 The Arctic and the peculiarities of its legal
regime were not at the forefront of global attention. For this reason, that the issue of
ice-covered areas was left to the states directly created little controversy. The three states
had different agendas, but in part, thanks to the multilateral nature of the negotiating
environment at UNCLOS III, their interests overlapped sufficiently to reach a special
Arctic compromise.
As noted in the preceding, Canada was a spiritus movens behind the Article 234
negotiations. Canada’s interest relating to navigation at UNCLOS III was twofold.20
First, it was important for Canada to prevent the recognition of the NWP as a strait
used for international navigation that would have entailed the application of a liberal
regime of navigation through it. Second, Canada sought international recognition for its
1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Protection Act (AWPPA).21 Canada’s principal objective
boiled down to preventing the NWP from “internationalization.”22 In pursuit of these
political goals, Canada had, at least since 1969, acted as an important member of the
so-called coastal states group.23 This group was interested in establishing a 12-nm width
for the territorial sea and advocated for coastal state jurisdiction to adopt necessary
measures respecting marine pollution.
The interests of the Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union—
major maritime states and naval superpowers—converged in their appreciation of mari-
time and naval mobility and the general interest of containing the expansion of coastal
18 In particular, the record of declassified correspondence, available in the US National Archives aad.archives.gov/aad/
index.jsp (accessed 27 September 2020). Although these documents were declassified some time ago, they have
received little attention in academic writing on Article 234. One exception is J. Kraska, "Governance of Ice-Covered
Areas: Rule Construction in the Arctic Ocean" (2014) 45 Ocean Development and International Law 260.
19 UN General Assembly Resolution 3067 (XXVIII), 16 November 1973.
20 Bartenstein, note 2, 26.
21 AWPPA, note 4.
22 See discussion that follows.
23 See M. R. M’Gonigle and M. W. Zacher, "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Control of Marine Pollution" in B. Johnson
and M. W. Zacher (eds.), Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (University of British Columbia Press,
1977), 113–115.
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state jurisdiction. Although the two states differed on the issue of the acceptable max-
imum width for the territorial sea,24 a liberal regime of navigation through international
straits was an absolute priority for both.25 The regime of navigation through straits
became one of the key issues for UNCLOS III at an early stage. Other issues, such as
the determination of the maximum width of the territorial sea and the emergence of
the EEZ, were all conditioned upon an agreement on straits.26
Unlike the United States, but similarly to Canada, the USSR was preoccupied with
sovereignty-oriented Arctic claims that were, however, not fully articulated. For that rea-
son, the USSR felt it was best not to discuss its claims with other states.27 When the
United States proposed a regional conference on the Arctic, it was met with a lukewarm
response from Canada and a resolute rejection by the USSR.28
Canada’s stance was slightly less apprehensive of the potential engagement of inter-
national institutions in the Arctic than the USSR. After all, the crux of Canada’s efforts
after the adoption of the 1970 AWPPA was to attract international attention to the
Arctic and attract support for “special measures.”29
In any event, the discussions that eventually resulted in Article 234 were mostly
fueled by Canada’s desire to obtain international recognition of the 1970 AWPPA.
Background to the 1970 AWPPA
The 1970 AWPPA was adopted in response to US interest in a shipping route for oil
through the NWP. After the discovery of oil in the area of Prudhoe Bay on Alaska’s
North Slope in 1968, American oil companies decided to test the feasibility of a mari-
time route through the NWP to transport the oil by tankers.30 One test of these plans
was the 1969 voyage of the SS Manhattan through the NWP—a controversial voyage
24 The USSR had established a 12-nm belt of territorial waters in 1960. Statute on the Protection of the State Border of the
USSR, 5 August 1960, Vedomosti VS RSFSR, 1960, No. 31. The United States submitted “Draft Articles on the Breadth of the
Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries to the Seabed Committee,” see A/AC. 138/SC. II/L.4, reproduced in (1971) 10 International
Legal Materials, 973. This document explains that although the US government adheres to the traditional 3-nm width of the
territorial sea, it is prepared to agree to a treaty establishing a 12-nm width, provided there is agreement on the issue
of straits.
25 In 1968, the United States and the USSR intended to address the straits issue bilaterally, having prepared and
circulated a draft convention on the breadth of the territorial sea that guaranteed free passage for all ships and aircraft
through international straits connecting areas of high seas. See R. D. McConchie and R. S. Reid, "Canadian Foreign
Policy and International Straits, " in Johnson and Zacher, note 23, 174.
26 See D. D. Caron, "The Great Straits Debate: The Conflict, Debate, and Compromise that shaped the Straits Articles on
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," in D. D. Caron and N. Oral (eds.), Navigating Straits:
Challenges for International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 2014), 14–15.
27 In a message from the US Embassy in London to the US Department of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
State, "LOS: Regional Pollution Agreement for Arctic, " Confidential message, 3 May 1974, Declassified and released, US
Department of State 30 June 2005, aad.archives.gov (accessed 27 September 2020), the US Embassy in London
reported to the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State that a change of Soviet
attitude has taken place. Specifically, it was reported that the Soviets indicated that they "may be willing to discuss
Arctic pollution agreement bilaterally (or possibly multilaterally) with other Arctic States.” The report further indicates
that the Soviets had previously “refused to enter such discussions on grounds that Soviet Union is sovereign in its
Arctic areas."
28 McConchie and Ried, note 25, 173, footnote 59, highlighted that in response to the US initiative, eight separate
proposals for a regional conference were made, all vetoed by the USSR.
29 According to R. M. M’Gonigle, "Unilateralism and International Law: The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act"
(1976) 34 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 180, 195, the 1970 AWPPA was, from the beginning, intended to
stimulate the development of international law.
30 E. Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic: Canadian and Russian Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 75.
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that led to domestic debates in Canada over ways to protect the waters of the NWP
from the unauthorized passage of foreign vessels, including oil tankers. The SS
Manhattan’s first trip was repeated in 1970. Although the enterprise was successful in
the sense that the SS Manhattan managed to sail through the NWP, the tanker had to
be accompanied by US and Canadian icebreakers, freed from ice numerous times, and
the vessel suffered structural damages, such as a punctured hull.31 These problems not
only had a chilling effect on the idea of oil transported by tankers instead of by pipe-
lines, but they also fueled Canadian concerns over the safety of vessel passage through
ice-covered waters within its Arctic archipelago.
The question of the legal status of waters within the Canadian Arctic Archipelago
was politically sensitive. In 1969, Canada had a territorial sea of 3 nm, and the plan was
to send the SS Manhattan through the high seas corridor in the NWP. The Canadian
Government traditionally had referred to these Arctic waters as “Canadian waters”;
however, the legal basis for such a claim had not been formulated.32 Although the voy-
age of the Manhattan was officially downplayed as not challenging Canadian sover-
eignty,33 the domestic reaction first focused on the sovereignty issues rather than on
issues of the environment.34
When addressing the House of Commons, Prime Minister Trudeau recognized that
although the waters within the Canadian Archipelago had always been regarded as
“national terrain,” there also existed “a contrary view.”35
The emphasis on the concern for the environment arising from the voyage of the SS
Manhattan was expressed only a year after the announcement of the intention to navi-
gate through the NWP. On 19 June 1969, Paul St. Pierre, a Liberal Member of
Parliament (MP), raised the risk of pollution as a significant implication of the SS
Manhattan voyage.36 His argument pointed toward the need for Canada’s exercise of
sovereignty in these waters in order to secure the protection of the environment. In
October 1969, the Canadian government presented its policy, the key of which was the
attention given to the environmental aspect of human activity in the Arctic. The
Throne Speech of 23 October 1969 was the first pronouncement of the intent to intro-
duce new legislation “setting out the measures necessary to prevent pollution in the
Arctic Seas.”37 The focus on the environmental concerns turned out to be a way to
31 See ibid, 75–78, for a detailed overview of the two voyages, their background, and Canada’s response.
32 Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau reiterated that the declaration of a 100-nm Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Zone
by Canada was not aimed at asserting sovereignty. See Canada, "Canadian Prime Minister’s Remarks on the Proposed
Legislation, Transcript of Prime Minister Trudeau’s Remarks to the Press following the Introduction of Legislation on
Arctic Pollution, Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones in the Canadian House of Commons on 8 April 1970," reproduced in
(1970) 9 International Legal Materials 600, 602. At the same time, Canada extended the width of its territorial sea to
12 NM. However, the waters within the Canadian Arctic Archipelago were still referred to as “Canadian,” without
specifying what this entails. See Canada, "Canadian Reply to US Government of 16 April 1970, Summary of Canadian
Note of April 16, Tabled by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House April 17," reproduced in (1970) 9
International Legal Materials 607, 613.
33 M’Gonigle and Zacher, note 23, 109–110.
The Manhattan planned to stay on the high seas for the whole voyage, which was consistent with the objective of
the voyage, which was to test the commercial feasibility of oil transportation. See S. Lalonde, "Evaluating Canada’s
Position on the Northwest Passage in Light of Two Possible Sources of International Protection," in Clive H. Schofield,
Seokwoo Lee and Moon-Sang Kwon (eds.), Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 577.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid, 109, referring to Can. H.C. Deb., 15 May 1969, 8720–21. See also Franckx, note 30, 75.
36 Ibid, 110.
37 Ibid, 111–112, referring to Can. H.C. Deb., 23 October 1969, 3.
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achieve much of what a claim to sovereignty could do. The upside of such a functional
and targeted approach was that it was less controversial than a direct sovereignty claim.
It also aligned with growing global sentiments about the environment in general and
vessel-source pollution in particular.
The first move taken by Canada to defend its control over the NWP was the adop-
tion of the 1970 AWPPA. As observed by McRae, the choice made by Canada was to
take a functional approach to “exercise only the jurisdiction required to achieve the spe-
cific and vital purpose of environmental protection.”38 The 1970 AWPPA extended
Canada’s jurisdiction over foreign vessels to an area of 100 nm from land—an area
broader than any acceptable width of the territorial sea. Canada asserted the right to
regulate navigation, including the right to prohibit it or regulate matters such as con-
struction, designing, equipment, and crewing standards.39
Although in 1970, Canada had yet to formally declare the waters of the NWP as fall-
ing under its sovereignty,40 it undertook a number of actions. In addition to enacting
the 1970 AWPPA, Canada extended the width of the territorial sea from 3 nm to
12 nm.41 At the time, the issue of the maximum width of the territorial sea was not
internationally resolved, although a trend had been developing toward the acceptance of
a 12-nm width. This issue was settled only with the adoption of the UNCLOS, and after
the regime of transit passage was secured as a trade-off.
Canada had good reasons to suspect that the 1970 AWPPA would lead to inter-
national protests.42 To avoid the challenge of potential international litigation, Canada
filed a reservation to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice.43 Prime Minister Trudeau explained the decision, noting that inter-
national law had not developed sufficiently to correspond with new realities, and that
Canada would help it develop.44
Canada’s Pursuit of International Acceptance of the 1970 AWPPA Before
UNCLOS III
After the adoption of the 1970 AWPPA, but before the commencement of UNCLOS
III, Canada sought to convince the rest of the world to support its cause. Canada’s
38 D. McRae, "The Negotiation of Article 234," in F. Griffiths (ed.), Politics of the Northwest Passage (McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1987), 101.
39 For an overview of the 1970 AWPPA, see D. McRae and D. J. Goundrey, "Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters:
The Extent of Article 234," (1982) 16 University of British Columbia Law Review 197, 205–207.
40 Bartenstein, note 2, 26, mentions the letter dated 17 December 1973, written by the Bureau of Legal Affairs,
reproduced in E. G. Lee, "Canadian Practice in International Law During 1973 as Reflected Mainly in Public
Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs" (1974) 13 Canadian Yearbook of International
Law 272, 277–279, as the first official Canadian claim of internal waters.
41 Lee, note 40, 283.
42 A. de Mestral, "Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Its Origins and Its Future," in S.
Lalonde and T. L. McDorman (eds.), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honor of Donat Pharand
(Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 113, refers to “a drawer full of protests” received by Canada in response to the enactment of the
1970 AWPPA.
43 Canada, "Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice" (7 April
1970) reproduced in (1970) 9 International Legal Materials 598, 598–599. The declaration terminated the acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction of the nternational Court of Justice (ICJ) over disputes regarding, inter alia, “the prevention or
control of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada.” See
McRae, note 38, 101.
44 Trudeau, note 32, 600.
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choice was not the obvious one, as it could have attempted to solve the issue as a bilat-
eral matter with the United States, or as a regional matter with other states interested in
the Arctic.45
The opening for Canada to make its case globally arose in 1970 when the United
States proposed the convening of a conference on the Arctic.46 However, neither
Canada nor the USSR was interested in having the issues of territorial or jurisdictional
limits in the Arctic discussed at a multilateral conference. Canada, however, indicated
some interest in a conference limited to discussing the rules for environmental protec-
tion and the safety of navigation in the Arctic waters,47 with a caveat that it could be
done “within the framework of Canada’s proposed legislation.”48 It soon became appar-
ent that the regional solution held little promise for success. Canada was anxious not to
be outnumbered by major maritime states; the United States was unable to secure sup-
port for leading the conference; and the USSR was not interested in discussing the legal
status of the Arctic in a multilateral setting.49 In the end, no regional conference
took place.50
Canada advocated its interests at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment in Stockholm that resulted in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.51 Canada
participated actively in the conference, and proposed, among other things, the following
as a principle:
A State may exercise special authority in areas of the sea adjacent to its territorial waters
where functional controls of a continuing nature are necessary for the effective prevention
of pollution which could cause damage or injury to the land or marine environment under
its exclusive or sovereign authority.52
The conference referred it to both the 1973 IMO Conference (dealing with MARPOL,
the International Convention for Prevention of Marine Pollution for Ships) and the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction (Seabed Committee).53 The latter, established initially as an ad hoc
committee to study the questions raised by Ambassador Pardo of Malta concerning the sea-
bed beyond national jurisdiction,54 served as the Preparatory Committee for UNCLOS III.55
Canada submitted its proposal to the Sub-Committee III on Marine Pollution and
Research of the Seabed Committee as the 1973 Draft Articles for a Comprehensive
Marine Pollution Convention.56 Canada’s 1973 Draft Articles reflected Canada’s advocacy
for coastal state jurisdiction for environmental protection under “special” circumstances.
45 McRae, note 38, 102.
46 See J. Kirton and D. Munton, "The Manhattan Voyages and their Aftermath," in F. Griffiths (ed.), Politics of the
Northwest Passage (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 94–96.
47 Ibid, 94–96. M’Gonigle, note 29, 196, argues that Canada supported a regional Arctic treaty, but that the initiative
failed owing to the refusal of the USSR to participate.
48 See Canada’s reply to the US proposal, reproduced in McConchie and Ried, note 25, 173, footnote 59.
49 McRae, note 38, 102, and Kirton and Munton, note 46, 94–96.
50 McRae, note 38, 102.
51 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972.
52 McRae, note 38, 103.
53 Ibid.
54 UN General Assembly Resolution 2340 (XII), 18 December 1967.
55 UN General Assembly Resolution 2750 C (XXV), 17 December 1970.
56 A/AC.138/SC.III/L.28, Draft Articles for a Comprehensive Marine Pollution Convention, submitted by Canada, 9 March
1973, reproduced in (1973) 12 International Legal Materials 564, (Canada’s 1973 Draft Articles).
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Canada put forward the idea that the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment is an overarching obligation, which states must satisfy regardless of
“internationally agreed measures,” if necessary. Article IV of the proposal reads:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as preventing a State from taking such measures
as may be necessary to meet the obligation under Article I within the limits of its national
jurisdiction, including environmental protection zones (maximum limits to be determined) (a)
pending the establishment and implementation of internationally agreed measures contemplated
by this Convention or, (b) following the establishment or implementation of any internationally
agreed measures if such measures fail to meet the objectives of this Convention or if other
measures are necessary in the light of local geographical and ecological characteristics.57
Interestingly, when the USSR submitted its Draft Articles for a Convention on
General Principles for the Preservation of the Marine Environment,58 it did not men-
tion the need for “special” environmental measures. Rather, the USSR emphasized that
any rules and standards relating to the prevention of pollution of the marine environ-
ment should take into account high seas freedoms. The proposals by Canada and the
USSR indicate that they were not on the same page.
Canada was also active during the 1973 IMO Conference on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution from Ships, where MARPOL59 was adopted. The conference was held after the
conclusion of the preparatory meetings for UNCLOS III. As such, it had the potential to
solve some issues before UNCLOS III and to set the tone for the coming conference.
Canada’s initial proposal to the preparatory meeting for the MARPOL Conference in
February 1973 closely resembled its proposal submitted a month later to the Seabed
Committee. Although Canada failed to obtain sufficient support at the preparatory
meeting, the issue of “special measures” resurfaced at the IMO Conference.
At this gathering a possible compromise started to take shape. The compromise solu-
tion was favorable to Canada, as it recognized the right of a coastal state to adopt more
stringent discharge, as well as design and equipment standards in “waters the particular
characteristics of which, in accordance with accepted scientific criteria, render the envir-
onment exceptionally vulnerable.”
The compromise on draft Article 8 reads as follows:
(1) Nothing in the present convention shall be construed as derogating from the powers of
any Party to the Convention to take more stringent measures, where specific circumstances
so warrant, within its jurisdiction, in respect of discharge standards.
(2) A Party shall not, within its jurisdiction, in respect of ships to which the Convention
applies other than its own ships, impose additional requirements with regard to ship
design and equipment in respect of pollution control. The requirements of this paragraph
do not apply to waters the particular characteristics of which, in accordance with accepted
scientific criteria, render the environment exceptionally vulnerable.
57 Ibid.
58 A/AC.138/SC.III/L.32, Draft Articles for a Convention on General Principles for the Preservation of the Marine
Environment, submitted by the USSR, 15 March 1973 (USSR’s 1973 Draft Articles).
59 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating
thereto, adopted on 2 November 1973/17 February 1978, entered into force 2 October 1983, 1340 UNTS 62 (MARPOL
73/78).
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(3) Parties which adopt special measures in accordance with the present Article shall notify
them to the Organization without delay. The Organization shall inform Parties to the
Convention about these measures.60
The clause was accepted in the committee by a vote of 29–10–8 and was incorporated in
the text submitted to the Plenary.61 From the perspective of the maritime states, the provi-
sion expanded coastal state jurisdiction, which could serve as a precedent during UNCLOS
III. From the coastal state perspective, the article is a restrictive approach, allowing “special”
measures only in an “exceptionally vulnerable” environment. The United States opposed
the provision both in the committee and in the Plenary.62 It would have been in the inter-
est of the USSR to support the article, as it was consistent both with its global maritime
interests and its Arctic-specific coastal interests. Canada had informed the USSR that it
might request the IMO to declare the Arctic a “special area,” presumably under MARPOL.
This was unacceptable to the USSR.63 Nevertheless, the USSR, which had supported the
clause in the committee, withdrew its support to the provision in the plenary vote “on last-
minute instructions from Moscow.”64 Several other Soviet bloc States also withdrew their
support, such that the provision fell short of the two-thirds majority required for inclusion
in the MARPOL Convention. The clause nonetheless gained majority support (26–22–14),
which indicates that the basic idea of what was to become Article 234 had considerable sup-
port. At the same time, the 1973 IMO Conference was dealing with a relatively narrow set
of issues when compared with UNCLOS III. As such, the support for ideas in one setting
did not easily translate into support for similar ideas in a different setting. The distinction
between MARPOL, the product of the 1973 IMO Conference, and UNCLOS is seen in
Articles 9(2) and 9(3) of MARPOL.65
Canada could not claim full success, given that the principles proposed by Canada
referencing “special authority” were not endorsed in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
and that it was unsuccessful in obtaining support for special measures at the IMO and
the Seabed Committee.66 Nevertheless, these efforts laid the groundwork for a more
successful campaign during UNCLOS III.
Negotiations During UNCLOS III
Arctic “Special Areas” as an Example of “Special Areas”
At UNCLOS III, Canada continued advocating for “special areas” with the intent of
attracting international support for the 1970 AWPPA. Canada’s advocacy was not
restricted to the Arctic “special areas,” as the latter concept was regarded as an example
60 The text is reproduced in Lee, note 40, 285, as Article 9, while McRae and Goundrey, note 39, 213, reproduce the
text as Article 8, with no reference to paragraph 3.
61 M’Gonigle and Zacher, note 23, 134.




65 MARPOL, Article 9(2), stipulates that “Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice … the present or future
claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State
jurisdiction.” Article 9(3) specifies that "jurisdiction" is to be construed in light of the international law in force at the
time of application or interpretation of MARPOL.
66 M’Gonigle and Zacher, note 23, 133.
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of “special areas” in which the environment was exceptionally vulnerable. Canada
argued that coastal states should be able to address “special” circumstances with
“special” measures.
In July 1974, Canada raised the issue of ice-covered waters as one example of
“special” circumstances, along with congested traffic situations, shallow or narrow chan-
nels, or other situations.67 On 16 July 1974, the Canadian delegate, Legault, in a more
convoluted manner, again raised the issue of “special areas.”68 The intervention empha-
sized the drawbacks of pursuing a solely “international” approach to vessel-source pollu-
tion rules and standard-setting.69 The spirit of Canada’s position was that states need to
retain the ability to protect themselves, and for this they cannot rely solely on the IMO.
The latter point was conveyed, noting the inherently slow pace of decision making by
an international organization such as the IMO when responding to new challenges. The
point was that unilateral action is more effective.70 Canada’s view was that such unilat-
eralism would be utilized only when “strictly necessary … in response to particular
geographic, navigational or ecological situations, not adequately covered by international
rules and standards.”71
Canada focused on the need for effective regulation of vessel-source pollution in ice-
covered areas, and that this did not appear to be adequately achievable by the IMO.
Article 7(3)(b)(ii) of the Draft Articles on a zonal approach to the preservation of the
marine environment, cosponsored by Canada and other states and proposed on 31 July
1974, resembled the text submitted for the plenary vote at the 1973 IMO Conference
except that it attached further qualification for the adoption of “special measures.”
Where internationally agreed rules and standards are not in existence or are inadequate to
meet special circumstances, coastal States may adopt reasonable and non-discriminatory
laws and regulations additional to or more stringent than the relevant internationally
agreed rules and standards. However, coastal States may apply stricter design and
construction standards to vessels navigating in their zones only in respect of waters where
such stricter standards are rendered essential by exceptional hazards to navigation or the
special vulnerability of the marine environment, in accordance with accepted scientific
criteria. States which adopt measures in accordance with this subparagraph shall notify the
competent international organization without delay, which shall notify all interested States
about these measures.72
This approach was met with significant opposition from the maritime states.
At the commencement of UNCLOS III, the USSR did not seem to be as engaged
with the issue of “special areas” as Canada. The Soviet approach to the Arctic during
the Conference involved mixed messages. The US view was that the Soviets had indi-
cated a willingness to discuss the Arctic with other states.73 When the US delegation
67 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.27, Summary Records of Plenary Meetings 27th Plenary Meeting, 3 July 1974, Official Records
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume I, 95, [19].
68 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.4, Summary Records of Meetings of the Third Committee 4th Meeting, 16 July 1974,




72 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.6, Draft Articles on a Zonal Approach to the Preservation of the Marine Environment UN,
submitted by Canada, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, India, Iran, New Zealand, Philippines and Spain, 31 July 1974, Official
Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume III, 249, 250.
73 Message from the US Embassy in London to the US Department of State, note 27.
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raised the “Arctic pollution question,” noting the interest in Canada, and inquired
whether there was a possibility to work out an Arctic regime, the Soviet delegation
objected. The Soviets indicated that the “Arctic question” was to be “kept out of”
UNCLOS III, as it was “not possible to separate land and maritime interests in
the Arctic.”74
Toward the Bifurcation of “Special Areas”
The United States engaged in bilateral consultations with Canada on a range of law of
the sea issues. In the correspondence between the US Embassy in Caracas and the US
Department of State of 30 August 1974, one can note the first traces of a bilateral agree-
ment between the United States and Canada on the question of an Arctic “special
area.”75 The report gives an account of Canada expressing its willingness to confine the
“dangerous and vulnerable area concept” to “ice areas.”76 This appears to be the starting
point for the strategy to separate the notion of the “special areas” generally from the
Arctic. The same correspondence references other issues discussed by the two states.
Although there was some agreement on the need for an “international process to review
standards,” Canada reportedly showed an interest in securing the ability to implement
standards immediately pending an international review.77
Productive Private Talks Between Canada and the United States, and the
Soviet Reaction
Significant progress in bilateral negotiations between Canada and the United States was
made in January 1975. The correspondence from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the
Department of State of 15 January 1975 gives an account of two days of negotiation on
an agreement on the environmental regime for the Arctic and unimpeded transit of
straits.78 During the negotiations, described by Canada’s Alan Beesley as the most pro-
ductive talks with the United States in his 15 years of experience,79 the parties identified
areas of agreement and disagreement.
The areas of agreement included confining the special regime to an area described as
ice-covered areas within the economic zone (EEZ) and the territorial sea. The agree-
ment further discussed an exemption for military vessels; no standard setting within the
EEZ or international straits, except in ice-covered areas; and Canadian general support
for the unimpeded transit in straits used for international navigation.80 The agreement
74 Ibid.
75 Message from the US Embassy in Caracas to the US Department of State, Secretary of State, "LOS Conference—
Classified Analysis and Supplement to Final Report on Caracas Session," Confidential message, 30 August 1974,
Declassified and Released, US Department of State 30 June 2005, aad.archives.gov (accessed 27 September 2020).
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Message from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the US Department of State, Secretary of State, US Mission to the
United Nations, "Negotiations with Canadians on Environmental Special Area for Arctic and Transit of International
Straits," Confidential message, 15 January 1975, declassified by Margaret P. Grafeld, released US Department of State EO
Systematic Review 5 July 2006, aad.archives.gov (accessed 27 September 2020).
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
12 J. J. SOLSKI
would allow for setting aside the issues on the status of the NWP and would avoid
reopening the discussions on the definition of a strait used for international navigation.
Another area of agreement, according to the report, was on a “review mechanism
extended to all special standards.”81 However, the states disagreed concerning the nature
of an “international review mechanism for special standards promulgated by coastal
States for ice-covered areas.”82 Canada was willing to accept a “non-binding” review at
the IMO and a “binding review by compulsory dispute settlement procedures as to the
reasonableness” of special standards. In addition, Canada pushed for the effectiveness of
special standards upon promulgation (ante review). The United States argued for a
binding review by the IMO’s MEPC tacit amendment procedure and a review of the
effectiveness of special standards after approval (post review).83
In an April 1975 letter from the US Secretary of State to the US Mission in Geneva, a
reference is made to a “non-paper” delivered by the Soviet Minister Counselor
Vorontsov to Deputy Assistant Secretary Armitage.84 The “non-paper,” transmitted to
both the United States and Canada, notes the Canadian efforts to “legalize” its Arctic
regulations at the international level, as well as the US desire that such regulations be
subject to an international review by the IMO. According to the report, the Soviet dele-
gation insisted that it would not agree to submit its national rules regulating navigation
in the Arctic to the IMO for approval. Further, the Soviet Union indicated that it would
object to any attempts to impose upon the LOS Conference any proposal for submitting
Arctic state laws on the regulation of navigation and environmental protection for
approval or even consideration by the IMO or any other international organization.85
The “non-paper” further emphasized that any proposals to a similar effect are
“completely unacceptable for the USSR,” and that “great importance is attached to this
question.”86 The language used in the “non-paper” leaves little doubt with regard to the
position of the USSR.
In the meantime, the negotiations at UNCLOS III continued, and the Informed
Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) of 9 May 1975 included Article 20, which covered the
issue of both Arctic and non-Arctic special areas.87 Paragraph 4 addressed non-Arctic
“special areas,” where special measures being contemplated were subject to review by an
international organization. Paragraph 5 provided that
Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to affect the establishment by the coastal State of
appropriate nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for the protection of the marine
environment in areas within the economic zone, where particularly severe climatic
conditions create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and where pollution of
the marine environment, according to accepted scientific criteria, could cause major harm




84 Message from the US Secretary of State to the US Mission in Geneva, "LOS: Soviet Approach on Arctic," Confidential
message, 23 April 1975, declassified by Margaret P. Grafeld, released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 5
July 2006, aad.archives.gov (accessed 27 September 2020).
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/PART III, Informal Single Negotiating Text, Part III, Official Records of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume IV, 171.
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This provision did not acknowledge Canada’s commitment to the United States to
defer to some, even nonbinding, supervision by the IMO. There is some commonality
between Article 20(5) of the 1975 ISNT and Article IV of Canada’s 1973 Draft Articles,
both of which asserted a peremptory right of a coastal state under specific circumstan-
ces to adopt antipollution laws or regulations. The text of the 1975 ISNT, however,
more narrowly defined the areas in which the right would arise (“particularly severe cli-
matic conditions”). Nevertheless, the provision was considered too permissive and its
wording too vague,88 with the result that there were numerous proposals for revision.89
Soviet–Canadian Joint Proposal and the Reaction of the United States
The dynamics changed when the USSR and Canada presented to the United States their
joint proposal in February 1976:
The coastal state, notwithstanding the other provisions of this convention, has the right to
establish non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control
of marine pollution from vessels in areas within the limits of the economic zone, where
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most
of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of
the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the
ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to the protection of the
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.90
This is the earliest publicly available draft of the “Arctic clause.” It clearly builds upon
earlier negotiations; however, the engagement of the USSR and the resulting shift in the
balance of the negotiation power had an impact on the earlier United States–Canada com-
promise. The 1976 proposal separated ice-covered areas from other “special areas,” as had
been suggested by the United States. The asserted coastal state right exists
“notwithstanding the other provisions of this convention,” and thus, explicitly, the right to
adopt antipollution laws and regulations in the Arctic was a lex specialis. Further, there is
no reference to an international review mechanism. It is apparent that after Canada paired
with the USSR, they were able to strip any such review from the Arctic pollution provi-
sion. It is also noteworthy that the proposal includes minimal limitations on the coastal
state’s rights, although it introduces the language of “due regard,” with such regard
required for the protection of the marine environment only. “Navigation” may have been
added to the wording after a US intervention.
The joint Canadian/Soviet proposal came as a surprise to the United States, and appar-
ently required a swift response, including the setting up a task force “ASAP” to defeat or
modify the proposal.91 John Norton Moore, who served as US Ambassador and Deputy
Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea Conference (1973–1976), and
thus oversaw the bilateral negotiations on the ice-covered areas with Canada, writes that it
88 M’Gonigle and Zacher, note 23, 141–142.
89 Myron H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary Volumes I–VII
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), Vol. IV, 393.
90 Message from the US Mission Geneva to the US Department of State, Secretary of State, "Canadian/Soviet Proposal
on Arctic," Confidential message, 3 February 1976, declassified by Margaret P. Grafeld, Released US Department of State
EO Systematic Review 4 May 2006, aad.archives.gov (accessed 27 September 2020).
91 As suggested in the US cable of 3 February 1976, ibid.
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was the United States that stood behind the idea to carve away opposition and offer the
Canadians extraordinary authority within ice-covered areas only.92 He states that at the
time he left his position, the language was tougher than “due regard.”93
It is interesting to observe the evolution of the Soviet approach to the Arctic at
UNCLOS III. At first, the USSR showed an ambivalent attitude to Canada’s attempts to
obtain legitimization for its Arctic legislation. During the 1973 IMO Conference, the
USSR had supported Canada in the committee, only to withdraw its support before the
vote in the Plenary. One might expect that the USSR would have a similar attitude during
UNCLOS III. However, the idea to single out the Arctic appears to have led the USSR to
take a proactive approach. It likely did not seem realistic to maintain the position that the
future ocean treaty would not apply in the Arctic Ocean. Facing this reality, the USSR
joined and bolstered Canada’s position with the United States in the negotiations of the
Arctic clause and were able to shape the Arctic clause to fit its interests.
Ad Referendum Agreement and the Understanding by the US Delegation
By mid April 1976, the delegations of Canada, the United States, and the USSR had
reached ad referendum agreement (subject to final approval), predicated on Canada’s sup-
port for the US position on straits and on the final approval of their respective govern-
ments.94 Just days before the drafting of the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT),95
the United States awaited a final seal of approval from Canada for the bilateral deal. The
fear was that Canada and the USSR would propose the text bilaterally, without support
from the United States. This scenario appears to have been possible as the Bulgarian dele-
gate, Yankov, representing a member of the Soviet bloc, as the Chairman of the Third
Committee, was responsible for the drafting. As reported by the US delegation,
Canada would doubtlessly be pleased to have [an] Arctic article put in [the] revised text
without final US approval if [the] result were that Canada did not have to support [the]
US position on straits.96
The United States was on the brink of losing Canada’s endorsement on straits after
Canada and the USSR linked up and allegedly worked on their own proposal on ice-covered
areas.97 A further cable suggests that as late as 5 May 1976, the United States had not
obtained Canada’s final approval for the deal.98 Nevertheless, on 6 May 1976, Article 43, a
prototype of Article 234, was included in the 1976 RSNT.99 One may speculate on whether
92 J. Norton Moore, "The UNCLOS Negotiations on Ice-covered Areas" in M. H. Nordquist, T. H. Heidar, and J. Norton
Moore (eds.), The Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 21.
93 Ibid, 21–22.
94 Message from the US Mission to the United Nations (New York) to the US Embassy in Ottawa, the US Department of
State, Secretary of State, "LOS: Arctic Pollution Article," Confidential message, 30 April 1976, declassified by Margaret P.
Grafeld, Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 4 May 2006, aad.archives.gov (accessed 27
September 2020).
95 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/PART III, Revised Single Negotiating Text, (part III), Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Vol. V, 173.
96 US Confidential message, 30 April 1976, note 94.
97 Kraska, note 18, 264, states that “The United States had—just barely—boarded the train as it left the station.”
98 Message from the US Department of State to the Secretary of State, US Delegation Secretary, "LOS: Arctic Pollution
Article," Secret message, 5 May 1976, declassified by Margaret P. Grafeld, released US Department of State EO
Systematic Review 4 May 2006, aad.archives.gov (accessed 27 September 2020).
99 UNCLOS, Revised Single Negotiating Text, note 95.
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the tension days before the first inclusion of the provision on ice-covered areas in the
RSNT had any bearing on further concessions made by any of the negotiating states.
An informative source on the understanding that the US delegation attached to the
agreed wording is the US “Request for Instructions on an Article on Vessel Pollution
Control in the Arctic, of 28 April 1976.”100 This includes the Memorandum for the
President.101 The 1976US Memorandum, secret at the time of drafting and approved
for release in 2003, spells out the background, intricacies, and ramifications of the
agreement reached among the three states.
First, it describes clearly the area of application of Article 234, namely, “areas in the
Arctic within the economic zone and the territorial sea.” The text further specifies the
practical implications of such delimitation on the potential geographic scope of applica-
tion. The 1976US Memorandum admits that
the freedom of navigation in the economic zone and the right of innocent passage in the
territorial sea would apply in the Arctic subject, of course, to the regulatory and
enforcement powers in the Arctic Article, which are complete powers with regard to vessel
pollution control.102
Second, it recognizes that the US policy to subject the exercise of coastal STate
powers to binding review by the IMO had failed, as it was unacceptable to the USSR
and Canada owing to, inter alia, their sovereignty claims in the Arctic. Third, the rights
of passage in Arctic straits would be subject to the “Arctic Article.” Fourth, the military
exemption would apply to the “Arctic Article.” Fifth, regarding safeguards, the 1976US
Memorandum indicates that the “due regard” clause does not provide specific objective
protection for navigational interests in the area. The intention is expressed that the nor-
mative standard of the clause could still be changed to read:
Such laws and regulations shall not have the practical effect of impeding freedom of
navigation and shall have due regard for the protection of the marine environment based
on the best available scientific evidence.103
In the event of a failure to change the text, the 1976US Memorandum urged that the
delegation should be instructed to obtain from Canada and the Soviet Union an under-
standing that the due regard clause would be interpreted as to “not have the practical
effect of impeding freedom of navigation.” As the text of Article 234 remained
unchanged, it is not clear whether such understanding was ever obtained.
Final Observations
The provision that became Article 234 was incorporated without dissent into the vari-
ous UNCLOS negotiating texts with only minor editing.
Carving out the notion of “ice-covered areas” from the “special areas” provision was
key for the acceptance of Article 234. A general proposition that a state would be able to
100 The US "Law Of The Sea—Request For Instructions On An Article On Vessel Pollution Control In The Arctic," Secret
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unilaterally regulate vessel-source pollution in vast expanses of the EEZ was unlikely to be
acceptable to the global community.104 Limiting unilateral regulation to ice-covered areas
suited Canada’s goals. For both the United States and the USSR, it was important that the
precedent-setting potential of the Arctic clause be limited. The allocation of autonomy in
decision making to the coastal state was acceptable to the United States, as well as to
other maritime states, as a result of the clear geographical limitation not only where ships
were exposed to additional risks but, more importantly, where there had been low interest
in unassisted navigation. It was evident that the practical relevance of these areas for trad-
itional commercial shipping was limited and that any commercial activity in the Arctic
could only be viable with the participation of the relevant coastal states.
The concessions that Canada and the USSR made during the negotiation of Article 234
were limited to relatively weak safeguards, such as the reference to nondiscrimination, the
due regard clause, and the requirement of scientific evidence, in addition to the exemption
for state-owned vessels, and the availability of compulsory dispute settlement procedures.
An essential fact that, for obvious reasons, is not reflected in the text is that Article 234
formed part of a larger package deal. The United States appears to have made the most sig-
nificant concessions as regards Article 234—providing parameters for coastal state jurisdic-
tion in a geographically limited area of the Arctic. This was done, however, as a matter of
quid pro quo agreement in exchange for Canadian support for the US position on straits.
The United States was satisfied with the compromise reached on the issue of straits, as
reflected in the ISNT of the Third Session.105 The text did not define straits used for inter-
national navigation; rather, it described straits to which the section on transit passage would
apply as “straits which are used for international navigation between one area of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone and another area of the high seas or an exclusive eco-
nomic zone.” The United States was primarily interested in not opening this issue.106
Canada’s initial position was set out in its draft article on a definition of an international
strait,107 where it referred to an international strait as a “natural passage … which … has
traditionally been used for international navigation.” Eventually, the US support on ice-cov-
ered areas led Canada to change its position and endorse the US-supported text.108
Furthermore, the agreement on the Arctic clause was reached in a package with other
understandings. All three states agreed to fight the linkage between the “Arctic Article”
and other “special areas,” for instance. This would prevent other states from arguing
they should have similar rights in vulnerable areas. For both the United States and the
USSR, a concession in the Arctic meant decreased momentum of creeping coastal state
jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution in other areas of the world. This was particu-
larly felt when the negotiation on Arctic special areas was severed from the negotiation
respecting other special areas, with the latter ending up with much more circumscribed
104 See Moore, note 92, 20.
105 Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), note 87.
106 See, for instance, US Message, note 98, where the US delegate Learson recommends what should be done to
convince the Canadian delegate MacEachen to support the United States on straits. This includes an argument that “we
cannot take the risk of reopening substantive questions on such a vital issue in order to improve drafting.” The US
Department of State concurred with proposed action but strengthened the language to be used in discussion with
Canadians: “We are not willing to reopen substantive negotiations on the vital straits issue.”
107 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.83, Draft Article on a Definition of an International Strait, submitted by Canada, 26 August
1974, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume III, p. 241.
108 See Bartenstein, note 2, 27 and McRae, note 38, 111–112.
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coastal state powers under Article 211(5) and (6) of UNCLOS. A way to do that was to
agree not to make public the “Arctic Article” until late in the UNCLOS process, thus
discouraging much discussion on the text. This possibly limited the extent of consult-
ation on the provision. The 1976US Memorandum reveals that the United States con-
sulted other maritime and Arctic states, of which Denmark, Norway, Japan, and the
United Kingdom are explicitly mentioned as supporting the provision.109
Article 234 suited the political goals of the Soviet Union, once it became apparent
that the USSR could not avoid the question of the Arctic at UNCLOS III. The article
did not prejudice freedom of navigation other than in a limited area of the Arctic, and
it could work in favor of the Soviet Arctic claims. Moreover, it appears that the lack of
an IMO review mechanism was at the behest of the USSR. Canada might have sought
recognition for a unilateral right to adopt measures without a review mechanism, but
this issue seems not to have been Canada’s imperative. Canada was preoccupied with
the effectiveness of coastal state measures in the Arctic, but this could also be achieved
with, for instance, a nonbinding review at the IMO. For the USSR, the IMO not having
any role seems to have been a sine qua non condition for agreement on the Arctic art-
icle. In any case, after the USSR joined Canada in the negotiation of Article 234, the
language of the negotiation draft clearly shifted toward lesser restrictions on coastal
state jurisdiction. Thus, it is evident that without Soviet participation, the Arctic clause
would likely not have been as unique as it ended up being.
One should take note that the Soviet 1971 Statute on the NSR Administration110 bore
some resemblance to the Canadian 1970 AWPPA, and that the latter arguably motivated
the former. When the USSR joined Canada in favor of a potential bilateral agreement
on ice-covered areas, this changed the dynamics of the negotiations between Canada
and the United States. The USSR was reported to have given the text of its proposal to
UNCLOS III Third Committee Chairman Yankov, pending US approval.111 While the
USSR was not the initiator of Article 234, that the USSR was satisfied with the outcome
was indicated by the quick implementation of Article 234 in legislation, at least in a
broad sense, with some significant omissions and additions.112
Conclusions
Article 234 was the result of a unique compromise, primarily a product of negotiations
between the two Cold War protagonists, the United States and the USSR, and Canada,
which provided the driving force behind the provision. However, the groundwork for
the provision was set prior to the commencement of UNCLOS III.
What the analysis of the origins of Article 234 reveals is that a crucial factor for its
acceptability was the geopolitical context surrounding the issue of the internationaliza-
tion of the Arctic. The lack of clarity concerning the legal status of some waters, and
the jurisdictional claims of Canada and, more importantly, of the USSR created an
109 US letter, April 1976, note 100.
110 Decree on the Confirmation of the Statute of the Administration of the Northern Sea Route Attached to the Ministry
of the Maritime Fleet, 16 September 1971, Sobraniye Postanovleniy Soveta Ministrov SSSR No. 17, 124.
111 US message, 5 May 1976, note 98.
112 See Franckx, note 30, 178–179.
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environment where any agreement could be perceived as successful. While Canada
appeared to be willing, although with great reserve, to negotiate the parameters of an
international legal regime for the Arctic with other states, the USSR adamantly refused
to negotiate any international rules for the marine Arctic. However, in light of Canada’s
policy to obtain international recognition for the 1970 AWPPA, the USSR faced diffi-
culty in resisting some international attention on the Arctic during UNCLOS III. An
international agreement on the Arctic without the USSR would have been fragile. The
USSR decided to join and support Canada, but arguably under the condition that the
provision would not prejudice its policy of maintaining full control over the waters
adjacent to its Arctic coast. After the USSR joined the Article 234 negotiations, the bal-
ance shifted away from the United States, and the price for having the USSR at the table
was the dropping of an international review mechanism.
Finally, the analysis of the historical background indicates that some of the interpret-
ational challenges posed by inconsistent language, such as the question of the correct
interpretation of the phrase “within the limits of the exclusive zone,” were not inten-
tional.113 The three protagonists reached an unequivocal agreement that Article 234
would apply in the EEZ and the territorial sea, although this agreement was reflected in
the text rather poorly.114 There is, moreover, no trace of a debate about this, and subse-
quent practice confirms this interpretation.115
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